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As a Lutheran, I have always found a special appeal in nailing up theses as
a means of communication. Even in modern scholarly discourse, I think this
can be a highly effective way of raising the very issues most in need of atten-
tion at the present time. This essay is my attempt to address in a practical way
the current state of historical Jesus research from the point of view of method-
ology, in particular from the viewpoint of the so-called criteria of authenticity.1
I have limited myself to seven theses.
1. Scholarly Inquiry Must Have Guidelines to Follow
I start with a seemingly easy case. For is this not actually quite self-evi-
dent? It should be, yet one surprisingly often hears voices demanding the abol-
ishment of the authenticity criteria. Such a demand is in principle understand-
able if, as a result of the abolishment (and perhaps for some other reason(s)
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1. By the criteria of authenticity I mean the tools of methodology specifically designed for
providing arguments for or against the historicity of the Jesus tradition or a particular instance of
it. The standard criteria are the criterion of dissimilarity, the criterion of multiple attestation, and
the criterion of coherence. These are also the most traditional of the criteria and are still today
employed by scholars, although several variations of them appear. For my previous accounts of
the criteria, see in particular T. Holmén, Jesus and Jewish Covenant Thinking, Leiden: Brill
2001, 24-36; Id., «Knowing about Q and Knowing about Jesus: Mutually Exclusive Undertak-
ings?», in A. Lindemann (ed.), The Sayings Source Q and the Historical Jesus, Leuven: Peeters
2001, 497–514; Id., «Authenticity Criteria», in C. A. Evans (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Histori-
cal Jesus, New York: Routledge, 2008, 43-54.
too), one also regards the inquiry that seeks to reach back beyond the sources
to the historical person of Jesus as entirely futile or impossible.2 Sometimes,
however, the criteria are discarded while still holding onto historical Jesus
research as a valid pursuit. The criteria are seen as too problematic to be use-
ful, as too complex,3 or then again, as too simplistic4 for descriptions of the
real world to be based on them. Accordingly, it is demanded that the historical
Jesus should be studied but not by means of the authenticity criteria.5
How ought this kind of standpoint to be explained? Indeed, it seems as if
for some scholars Jesus research would be better off without the methodologi-
cal guidelines6 that apply to its central aspect: the historicity of the historical
Jesus. Hence, the need for the thesis presented in this section! As far as I can
see, the dilemma mentioned results substantially from confusion about con-
cepts and terms. While the first point to be observed here, a), has to do with the
system and hierarchy of concepts, the second one, b), concerns impressions
and images that certain terms tend to create. In the following, it should be
allowed that a) will not be fully capable of untangling the knot until light is
brought by the insights presented in b).7
a) For some scholars, «criteria of authenticity» appears to be a subordinate
or narrower concept of the superordinate/broader concept of «methodological
guidelines for assessing the historicity of Jesus» (or something like that).
According to this way of speaking, the authenticity criteria represent but one
possible solution to the overarching task of somehow dealing with the problem
of historicity of the statements encountered or put forward about Jesus. In prin-
ciple, and in practice too, this line of reasoning holds that one or more other
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2. See B. L. Mack, The Christian Myth: Origins, Logic, and Legacy, New York: Continu-
um 2003, 25-40.
3. N. T. Wright, Jesus and The Victory of God , Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996, 133. 
4. D. C. Allison, The Luminous Dusk: Finding God in the Deep, Still Places, Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006, 100.
5. See, for instance, S. Freyne, Galilee, Jesus, and the Gospels, Philadelphia: Fortress,
1988, 12-13; A. P. Winton, The Proverbs of Jesus: Issues of History and Rhetoric, Sheffield:
JSOT Press, 1990, 122; L. E. Vaage, «Recent Concerns: The Scholar as Engagé», in W. E.
Arnal – M. Desjardings (eds.), Whose Historical Jesus?, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Universi-
ty Press 1997, 181-186, p. 181; D. C. Allison, «Jesus», in D. E. Gowan (ed.), Westminster The-
ological Wordbook of the Bible, Louisville: Westminster, 2003, 235-255, p. 235. Similarly
Wright, Jesus and The Victory of God, 87-89. This is also the upshot of Dunn’s long discussion
in J. D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2003, 139-336. 
6. J. D. Crossan, The Birth of Christianity: Discovering What Happened in the Years
Immediately after the Execution of Jesus, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999, 143-146, is correct in
stating that criteria as such do not constitute a method. For this reason I am calling the criteria
«methodological guidelines». For the rudiments of an authenticity method, see Holmén, «Crite-
ria», 45-47, 53-54.
7. This is still the best order and way to present the observations. 
ways to solve the task exist. On the basis of this thinking, then, it becomes
understandable how rejection of the authenticity criteria still does not need to
mean abandonment of historical Jesus research as such. In other words, it
seems probable that for those who wish to discard the authenticity criteria but
still think one can uphold historical Jesus research as a relevant pursuit, there
are some other tools that can serve as «methodological guidelines for assessing
the historicity of Jesus».8 The idea then, is either that since the authenticity cri-
teria have failed something else simply has to be found instead, or that since
the criteria have proven so problematic anything else should be preferred.
For other scholars, the concept «authenticity criteria» is not subordinate to
«methodological guidelines for assessing the historicity of Jesus» (or the like)
but equal to it, its paraphrase in some way. According to this way of construing
the concepts, the means to be applied when dealing with the problem of his-
toricity are to be called «authenticity criteria» whatever they are or will be 
– that is, whatever means one finds that could be useful in dealing with the prob-
lem of the historicity of the statements made about Jesus, whatever method-
ological guidelines one develops that could serve in assessing the historicity of
Jesus, these will always be called «authenticity criteria». Why? Because it is
essentially authenticity that is at issue here!9 In other words, it is not that one
would, for example, not wish to find alternatives to the authenticity criteria
currently in use but that whatever alternatives one finds, these would also be
called authenticity criteria because their purpose would be in any case to solve
the problem of the historicity of the statements made about Jesus. Once again:
it is not that there would not be the possibility of alternative tools or means, but
that there is no reasonable alternative way to name them, for there is no reason
to use diverging designations for tools, means and so on essentially serving
one and the same purpose. The idea sustained here is that if the authenticity
criteria currently in use have failed, better criteria should be found. Additional-
ly, one can always seek to find ways to employ the criteria, old or new ones,
better.10
A solution to this confusion could perhaps be that one chooses freely
between the different systems or hierarchies of concepts while at the same time
striving for a more enlightened discussion by realizing the differences in the
ways of speaking. For my part, a need for tools that are properly called authen-
ticity criteria exists as long as it remains true that there is in historical Jesus
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8. This is clearly the case with, for example, E. Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus and the Poli-
tics of Interpretation, New York: Continuum 2001, 51, 80-81. 
9. For «authenticity», observe point b) below. 
10. So, for instance, W. R. Telford, «Major Trends and Interpretative Issues in the Study
of Jesus», in B. Chilton – C. A. Evans (eds), Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluations of the
State of Current Research, Leiden: Brill 1994, 33-74, 59. 
research a problem of historicity concerning statements about Jesus encoun-
tered or made and that in order to pursue the research that problem somehow
has to be dealt with.
b) In addition, there are also certain impressions or images created by the
phrase «authenticity criteria» that contribute to the dilemma outlined above.
Clearly for some people, the words «authenticity» and «criterion/a» seem to
evoke the idea that the tools that the words taken together, according to the
convention, refer to are used as a kind of litmus paper test providing mechani-
cal on-off solutions and, furthermore, applied in order to ferret out the ipsissi-
ma verba Jesu, that is, the precise words Jesus used in a given occasion.11
Except for some rare and individual cases, however, this does not hold true of
today’s scholarship. On the contrary, scholars have long acknowledged that by
employing the authenticity criteria one is only dealing with grades of probabil-
ity, not with certainties.12 Similarly, scholars who today use the criteria recog-
nize that they are not particularly suited to identifying the ipsissima verba
Jesu.13 The pursuit of Jesus’ exact words is not really in focus anymore, and
even if it was in some separate enterprises, that is not how the criteria are
meant to be employed. Instead, it is the gist or main/general message of the tra-
dition materials that the criteria seek to capture and evaluate.14 That is how
they are also utilized by the overwhelming majority of scholars nowadays.
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11. Cf., for example, H. W. Hollander, «The Words of Jesus: From Oral Traditions to
Written Record in Paul and Q», NT 42 (2000) 340-357, p. 354; A. Kirk – T. Thatcher «Jesus
Tradition as Social Memory», in A. Kirk – T. Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text:
Uses of the Past in Early Christianity Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005, 25-42, p. 28;
T. C. Mournett, Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency: Variability and Stability in the Syn-
optic Tradition and Q, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2005, 72.
12. See Holmén, Covenant Thinking, 27. For what «proof» regarding historical texts can
mean, see G. Theissen – D. Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Crite-
ria, Louisville: Westminster 2002, 191-201. The characterization «litmus paper» comes, in fact,
from M. D. Hooker who in her famous articles resisted the quasi-scientific outlook strived at by
some analyses. The following almost prophetical statement is worth quoting: «He [the radical
scholar] looks for some kind of scientific verification – a litmus paper test which can be applied
to the sayings of Jesus, which turns either pink or blue, according to whether they are or are not
authentic, so that he may sort his material into neat piles»: M. D. Hooker, «On Using the
Wrong Tool», Theology 75 (1972) 570-581, p. 580. Thus, these words express Hooker’s criti-
cism.
13. D. L. Bock, «The Words of Jesus in the Gospels: Live, Jive, or Memorex?», in M. J.
Wilkins – J. P. Moreland (eds.), Jesus Under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents the Histor-
ical Jesus, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994, 73-100, 90; Holmén, «Criteria», 45. 
14. Besides the traditional ipsissima vox (J. Jeremias), scholars speak of ipsissima intentio
(Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 129-130) and ipsissima agenda (J. M. Foley, «Oral
Ancestor, Textual Precedent, or Ideological Creation?», in R. A. Horsley (ed.), Oral Perfor-
mance, Popular Tradition, and Hidden Transcript in Q, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature
2006, 129-140, p. 139s. See also below on «authenticity». 
«Authenticity» is, I believe, a major source of problems. Throughout the
Jesus quests there has been discussion about exactly how the concept should be
understood.15 (Whatever else, it should not be taken as carrying theological
significance, akin to «authoritative», or as leading to the idea of ipsissima
verba).16 Moreover, most recently, new tradition-historical views and expres-
sions such as «impact» or «abiding impression»17as well as the blurring of the
difference between authentic reminiscence and traditional growth18 have put
the concept under strain. In response to this development, I would like to
emphasize a pragmatic point of view. Whoever studies the historical Jesus, his
or her picture of Jesus will always consist of a selection made from the totality
of information available in the sources for Jesus. Even in approaches that seek
to include as much data as possible, something must be left out.19 In respect to
this, in my view, it does not count for much —if at all— how one labels the
material included, whether authentic, containing the abiding impression or
memory, or whatever. Irrespective of such labels, this is material by which a
scholarly presentation of Jesus is supported. In other words, I think it is unde-
niable that whichever scholar portrays whatever picture of the historical Jesus,
he or she will be making a claim regarding the material that is included in the
picture (and, indirectly, regarding the material that is excluded as well), and
that the most elementary form of the claim is that the included material has
been deemed useable in a scholarly reconstruction of the historical Jesus.20 As
to the labels, then, my preference for that kind of material is «authentic», if for
no other reason than that it belongs to the traditional grammar of historical
Jesus research.21 True, it also takes full responsibility for the claim made by
way of portraying a scholarly picture of Jesus.22
And finally, if the word «criterion» is the problem, for example by convey-
ing a sense of perfect certainty, there need be no hesitation in substituting it
T. HOLMÉN, «SEVEN THESES […] OF HISTORICAL JESUS RESEARCH» 347
15. See again Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 191-201. 
16. See J. H. Charlesworth, Jesus within Judaism: New Light from Exciting Archaeologi-
cal Discoveries London: SPCK, 1989, 20, and his remark on the authentic viewpoint which has a
sense comparable to the «gist or main/general message» spoken of above. Cf. also ipsissima
agenda and intentio.
17. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 333.
18. Kirk – Thatcher, «Jesus Tradition» passim. 
19. See N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, Minneapolis: Fortress
1992, 99-100. 
20. See T. Holmén, «A Metalanguage for the Historical Jesus Methods: An Experiment»,
in T. Holmén – S. E. Porter (eds.), Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Leiden:
Brill, 2009, forthcoming.
21. M. F. Bird, Jesus and the Origins of the Gentile Mission, London: T&T Clark 2007, 25.
Bird is also attracted to pragmatism but to a lesser degree than I am here. 
22. I think no discussion about concepts of tradition history however sound and justified
should detract from this responsibility. 
with some other expression. B. F. Meyer, for instance, prefers «index».23 Still,
it is perhaps also reasonable to argue that the term «criterion» is traditional
and, as long as it is emphasized that we are dealing with a range of probabili-
ties, no change of terminology needs to be undertaken.
Admittedly, the issues that this thesis has dealt with concern only the most
elementary confusions that bedevil the discussion about the authenticity crite-
ria. It is clear that more serious problems exist. Nonetheless, my point in the
thesis has been to show that the criteria should not be dispensed with altogeth-
er lightly. There must be guidelines for scholarly work and if one thinks that
the criteria of authenticity cannot form (part of) them, it needs to be carefully
considered and articulated what that would mean within the overall pursuit of
historical Jesus research. Obviously, a sweeping statement that an alternative is
to be preferred supported by reference to the plainest misuses and misconcep-
tions of the criteria is not enough. I think the following conclusion will stand
its ground under all circumstances:
The criteria of authenticity are and remain problematic and incomplete. At any
event, however, if one is to assess authenticity, this will always be more sensibly
done with the help of some explicitly stated tools and guidelines than without
them.24
The following theses penetrate deeper into the question and problem of the
criteria.
2. No Tool of Authenticity Can Beat Scepticism: There Is No Methodology
Good Enough to Make Bad Sources Useable
Those who doubt the usefulness of the criteria of authenticity sometimes
level the charge that those who, in contrast, do rely on the criteria are in fact
investing them with too high hopes.25 The criteria are not a magician’s equip-
ment, one at times can read between the lines. This puts the users of the criteria
in an uneasy position of defence. Do we really look as if we were wishing to
resort to otherworldly forces?
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23. B. F. Meyer, «Objectivity and Subjectivity in Historical Criticism of the Gospels», in
D. L. Dungan (ed.), The Interrelations of the Gospels, Leuven: Leuven University Press 1990,
546-565, 547. 
24. Holmén, «Criteria», 54.
25. E.g., Winton, Proverbs of Jesus, 124-125; D. L. Denton, Historiography and
Hermeneutics in Jesus Studies: An Examination of the Work of John Dominic Crossan and Ben
F. Meyer, London: T&T Clark 2004, 200, 207. 
I have a different theory. It may also be that distrust in the authenticity cri-
teria results from a disappointment originally experienced precisely because of
the fact that the criteria do not correspond to a magic wand and that, converse-
ly, confidence comes with expectations with regard to the criteria having had a
more realistic, that is, modest basis. Indeed, I would claim that the state of
affairs is exactly the opposite from how it is sometimes depicted. Those who
use the criteria usually realize the limitations of these tools26 while those who
wish to reject or replace them have probably approached them with too high
hopes. By their search for something else that could reassure them (and oth-
ers?) of firmer results than the criteria can provide, they merely seek to keep
alive the unrealistic basic idea of theirs: firm results.
This theory, however, provokes a further question. Why, then, does it suf-
fice for some people that the criteria even at their best can only yield sugges-
tions while others deem them dismissible for this very reason? The answer lies
not in the criteria but in the sources the criteria are applied to, or to be more
accurate, in how those who use or refuse to use the criteria regard the sources.
Indeed, it is of utmost importance to recognize the impact of this framework
within which the criteria of authenticity are viewed: the general assessment of
the historical value of the sources intended to be used in studying the historical
Jesus. At two opposite ends of the scale, a source can be deemed as basically
unreliable or basically reliable historically speaking. Shifting towards either
end of the scale, then, the assessment has crucial corollaries to viewing the
authenticity criteria. The more unreliable the sources are deemed, the greater
demands are placed on the criteria and the less persuasive they will appear. The
more reliable the sources are deemed, again, the more cogency the authenticity
criteria can be invested with.
For this reason, before engaging in extensive criticism of the criteria of
authenticity or, in general, any earnest debate over them, one’s assessment of
the sources for Jesus should be spelt out. Essentially differing judgments about
the historical value of the sources necessarily result in viewing the criteria and
their cogency very differently. In consequence, it is useless to argue about the
criteria, but instead the question about the sources should be laid on the table.
One great shortcoming of the current discussion about historical Jesus research
and the methodological challenges it entails is precisely that scholars’ assess-
ments of the sources are not explicitly connected with the criteria problem.
T. HOLMÉN, «SEVEN THESES […] OF HISTORICAL JESUS RESEARCH» 349
26. This statement should apply to mainline study of Jesus today. When Hooker in the
beginning of the 1970’s stated that «the tools which are used in an attempt to uncover the
authentic teaching of Jesus cannot do what is required of them», Hooker, «Wrong Tool», 570,
she was no doubt correctly addressing the situation prevailing then. To be sure, Hooker’s articles
are one major reason why prudent Jesus scholars no more understand the criteria in such
absolute terms. 
This silence effectively dispels hopes for scholarship coming to terms with the
divergent views about the criteria. To break the silence on my part, I see only
one possibility (which in my view is the lesson of a century of Jesus research
employing criteria of authenticity), viz. that at least on one of the following
points scholars need to have trust. They should –to a certain degree– trust
either the sources themselves or else the tools they use to probe the sources for
authentic material. To my mind, the criteria that have been developed in Jesus
research work well on the assumption that the sources they are applied to are to
be characterized as reliable rather than unreliable. What is questionable, how-
ever, is if any set of criteria can ever be developed that could suffice to revert
the speculations and scepticism appropriately arising when the sources are
regarded as unreliable rather than reliable. In my view, prospects of finding
authenticity criteria that could make bad sources yield good results are either
nil or unrealistic. Accordingly, it is but logical that those who do not find the
sources reliable enough also find the pursuit of Jesus research irrelevant.
Hence, scepticism about the criteria ultimately derives from scepticism
about the sources. Involved also here is the question of the burden of proof.
Scholars seeing the sources in a dubious light regarding their historicity would
place the burden of proof on showing authenticity. However, the burden of
proof emerging from a full-blown scepticism about the sources cannot be
borne by any single criterion, not even by all of them together. For there is no
method that could completely exclude the possibility of inauthenticity.27 There
will always be room for speculation whether one relies on the authenticity cri-
teria or seeks for alternatives to them, whatever these could be. On the other
hand, if the sources can instead be endowed with some credibility, the criteria
can identify the relatively best options regarding where to find material useable
in a scholarly portrait of the historical Jesus.
The theory does not always apply. The approach of the North-American
Jesus Seminar discloses a serious methodological hubris.28 Man has gone to the
moon and is heading for Mars, but in order to get to know the history of earth
he still requires good sources. However, if more than 80 % of the source mate-
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27. Following the usual procedure of his time, N. Perrin, for instance, demands that authen-
ticity is proven; N. Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, New York: Harper and Row
1967, 39. This demand made in the methodological discussion is, however, not consistently sus-
tained in the concrete analysis, where Perrin is often forced to place the burden of proof on
showing inauthenticity. The problem is indicative of the dilemma underlying the methodological
thinking of Perrin and his contemporaries: overconfidence in the criteria of authenticity necessi-
tated, in a way, by the lack of confidence in the sources.
28. See R. W. Funk and R. W. Hoover, The Five Gospels: The Search for the Authentic
Words of Jesus, New York: Scribner, 1996; R. W. Funk and The Jesus Seminar, The Acts of
Jesus: The Search for the Authentic Deeds of Jesus, San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco 1998.
rial is disinformation, not even a theologically disinterested (or disillusioned)
scholar can pull it off.29 Bad sources would indeed need magician’s tools. With
relatively good sources, however, we can manage with the ordinary earthly
means at our disposal.
3. The Criteria of Authenticity Are Not Dependent on the Tradi-
tional Tradition or Form Criticisms
The traditional, and Bultmannian, tradition and form criticisms are in
crisis.30 At the same time, it is claimed, so are the criteria of authenticity. Dif-
ferent models for depicting afresh the formation of the gospel tradition have
recently been (re)introduced and become a staple part of the discussion.
Besides questioning the uncontrolled informal nature of the tradition process,
they emphasize the role orality has had in the process. As to the authenticity
criteria, a central concern is the questioning of the ideas that, a), the gospel tra-
dition should be conceived of as consisting of small pericopes with histories of
their own as separate entities, as well as, b), these entities could (always) be
assumed to be derivable from single original forms. Since, then, the utilization
of the authenticity criteria precisely rests on dealing with small independent
units and the need to address their original form, it is concluded that the crite-
ria themselves have been rendered inappropriate.31
The logic of the suggested conclusion is quite impeccable. The premises it
builds on, however, do not hold true. The criteria of authenticity do not neces-
sarily presuppose traditional tradition and form critical solutions. The most
easily rehearsed decisive proof of this is the fact that the central criteria were
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29. Funk, Acts of Jesus, 1, gives the estimate that only 16 % of the deeds/events and 18 %
of the sayings of Jesus reported in the sources are historical. Cf. T. Holmén, «A Theologically
Disinterested Quest? On the Origins of the “Third Quest” for the Historical Jesus», ST 55 (2001)
175-197; and Funk’s remark, «critical scholars –those whose evaluations are not predetermined
by theological considerations»; Funk, Acts of Jesus, 1. 
30. See, for instance, Wright, Jesus; W. Kelber, The Oral and the Written Gospel: The
Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul and Q, Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press 1997; S. Byrskog, Story as History – History as Story: The
Gospel Tradition in the Context of Ancient Oral History, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2000; Dunn,
Jesus Remembered; A. Kirk – T. Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of the
Past in Early Christianity, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 2005; R. Bauckham, Jesus
and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2006; R.
A. Horsley, Oral Performance, Popular Tradition, and Hidden Transcript in Q, Atlanta: Soci-
ety of Biblical Literature 2006.
31. Kelber, Oral and the Written Gospel, 67; Kirk – Thatcher, «Jesus Tradition»,
passim; Mournett, Oral Tradition, 72, 80, 183-184. 
born before tradition and form criticisms saw the light of day.32 P. W. Schmie-
del anticipated the criterion of dissimilarity as well as the criterion of coher-
ence.33 F. C. Burkitt and B. H. Streeter developed principles that formed the
basis of the criterion of multiple attestation.34 It was only when the traditional
tradition and form criticisms began to be more generally accepted that the cri-
teria were adapted to them. That this happened was natural and understandable
and does not mean that the criteria could not, quite as naturally, be readapted to
the needs of a new situation.35 Of course, this implies work and problems can-
not be overcome overnight (or in one thesis). Nevertheless, the attempt can be
made.
In fact, it would be best to develop a methodological language, concepts
and terms that could make the criteria independent of any tradition-critical
solution. A key position is clearly held by the idea of pericopes as small inde-
pendent tradition units with histories of their own. If the language of the crite-
ria could be distanced from this idea much would already have been accom-
plished.
a) My suggestion is that we, on the basic level, speak about «a piece of
information» (sc. regarding the historical Jesus) the authenticity or inauthentic-
ity of which should be determined with the help of the criteria. As an English
expression, «piece» denotes singularity and here also implies integrity and
even limits for the item in question. So «piece» can be seen as referring to a
separate tradition unit, such as are distinguished in the traditional tradition and
form criticisms. The «limits» of the «piece» would then be warranted by the
usual tradition- and form-critical arguments. However, «piece» does not have
to be perceived this way alone. It can also be understood to point to something
that is separable on the grounds of informational contents. For instance, that
Jesus was a Jew, that he engaged public activity, that he taught about the king-
dom of God, etc., are all such «pieces of information» the authenticity of
which can be inspected by the criteria, and it can be seen that they have noth-
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32. S. E. Porter, «The Criteria of Authenticity», in T. Holmén – S. E. Porter (eds.),
Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Leiden: Brill 2009, forthcoming. As Porter also
remarks, however, their development took place during the heyday of form criticism. See further
in thesis 7 below.
33. P. W. Schmiedel, «Gospels», in T. K. Cheyne – J. S. Black (eds.), Encyclopaedia
Biblica II; London: A. & C. Black 1901, 1761-1898, 1881-1883, 1889. 
34. F. C. Burkitt, The Gospel History and its Transmission, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1906,
147; B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins, London: Macmillan and Co. 1924,
270.
35. Already D. G. A. Calvert, «An Examination of the Criteria for Distinguishing the
Authentic Words of Jesus», NTS 18 (1971-1972) 209-219, p. 218 complained against form criti-
cism’s «exclusive... role both in determining the criteria and in their application» and called for a
new approach to them.
ing to do with the form-critical division of the tradition material into small
independent pericopal units.
On the other hand, there are also pieces of information that are tied to cer-
tain passages of text. For instance, that Jesus was baptized by John the Baptist
is a piece of information that can be found specifically in Mark 1,9, Matt 3,15
and Luke 3,21. Obviously, that this is stated and this piece of information stud-
ied by means of the criteria cannot be seen as resorting to the tradition- and
form-critical scheme, even though some pericopes, i.e. traditional form-critical
units, could be identified here.36 The concept «piece of information» and how it
is used now is not dependent on the correctness of the traditional tradition- and
form-critical concept of pericope denoting an independent, separate tradition
unit with a history of its own, but the passages of text in question are distin-
guishable on the basis of the information they contain, viz. they speak about
Jesus’ baptism by John. 
Some further concepts are clearly required. A piece of information can be
found in a passage of text meaning simply a section of text distinguished on
the grounds of its informational contents, that is, it envelops the given piece of
information. My suggestion here is «passage of tradition» or «tradition pas-
sage», which represents an embodiment of a «piece of information» in a cer-
tain text. An example besides the baptism theme could be the tradition passage
about the relation between Jesus’ exorcisms and the kingdom of God in Matt
12,28 and Luke 11,20. That these texts represent an embodiment of the piece
of information mentioned can be established on informational grounds, mean-
ing simply that the texts are concerned with the relation between Jesus’ exor-
cisms and the kingdom of God. No traditional tradition- or form-critical argu-
ments are needed.
However, a piece of information can, as was seen, take on another form
still. It can appear as a «motif» (/theme): Jesus was a Jew, he engaged public
activity, he taught about the kingdom of God, etc.37 While an individual pas-
sage of tradition is tied with some certain words and shape, a particular motif
can in principle be expressed through several different, individual tradition
passages. For example, the overall, basic motif of the kingdom of God can be
found in numerous and highly diverse individual tradition passages. Obviously,
then, motifs usually consist of a more general kind of information compared
with tradition passages. Nonetheless, motifs can be more specific than this.
Luke 17,20-21 and Matt 12,28 and Luke 11,20, for instance, which display dif-
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36. Mark 1,9-11; Matt 3,13-17; Luke 3,21-22; cf. John 1,29-34.
37. «Motif» is of course not a new concept but it needs to take its place beside the idea of
«tradition passage» and, in fact, thus serves rather well.
ferent tradition passages, share not only the overall motif of the kingdom but
also the more particular motif of Jesus speaking of the kingdom as present.
Hence, in this way, I suggest, by concentrating on pieces of information dis-
tinguishable on the basis of informational contents rather than traditional tradi-
tion- or form-critical arguments, and then applying the criteria of authenticity
to them, the criteria can work irrespectively of the chosen overarching tradi-
tion-critical solution. What, however, about the need to apply the criteria to the
earliest form of a tradition?
b) This is clearly more difficult a problem. What has to be done becomes,
however, obvious when we ask why this goal has been adopted in the first
place. 
Usually, or should we say formerly, a measure that was required to be taken
prior to using the criteria of authenticity was a tradition-critical analysis by
means of which secondary elements of a tradition were identified and discard-
ed in order to reach towards the earliest form of the tradition. While perform-
ing the tradition-critical analysis always meant difficulties, not performing it
was, in most cases, not an option at all, at least with the usual/former view of
the sources: if the traditions of the sources are seen as containing later amend-
ments resulting from the adaptation of earlier forms of the traditions to the var-
ious situations of the early Christian communities, refraining from a tradition-
critical analysis risks getting misleading signals from the authenticity criteria.
Understandably, when tools designed for identifying Jesuanic material are
applied to later amendments they can produce a negative result. The presence
of later elements in a tradition would not, however, mean that the whole tradi-
tion is secondary. Therefore, in order to be able to use the criteria in a proper
way, one had to become aware of these later amendments, and the only means
by which even to attempt this was the tradition-critical analysis.
How should the language of the criteria be distanced from the problem
raised? Or does it have to be distanced and, if so, by how much? Could not the
concept «piece of information» and what has come up in a) already be seen to
facilitate the handling of b)? Or does the problematique arise at all when chang-
ing to another tradition-historical view? I shall start from the last question.
The difficulty exists even when assuming an alternative to the traditional and
Bultmannian tradition and form criticisms. Adaptation of the tradition by and
for the Christian communities did take place, be it that this process is pictured
(in many ways) differently by the alternative tradition-historical views. Accord-
ingly, whatever their means of entering the tradition, whatever the form of their
existence therein,38 features resulting from this adaptation are present in the
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38. See Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, 248. 
gospel tradition. The most crucial difference with respect to the problem raised
above lies in that pursuing the alternative views, one cannot propose to be able
to distinguish adaptation from the original core in the same way as before when
one almost could imagine these as distinct layers placed on the top of another.
Thus, the same problem is there and has in a way even become more intricate. It
cannot be bypassed by anyone who wants to study the historical Jesus.
Fortunately, the concepts introduced in a) allow us to deal with the problem
by means of the authenticity criteria instead of the traditional tradition-critical
analysis. All that needs to be added is the concept of integrality. For instance, a
piece of information can display features implausible with respect to Jesus’
environment and time.39 The methodical question that then needs to be posed is
whether the piece of information as such should be deemed as inauthentic or
just the implausible features of it. Answering the question depends on whether
the given features are to be seen as integral to the piece of information or not.
If the piece of information cannot go without all of the implausible features,
the piece itself can be labelled implausible and, accordingly, its authenticity is
in jeopardy.40
Naturally, the usefulness of the concept of integrality will be the next bone
of contention. I will provide just one short example to illustrate how the crite-
ria of authenticity could make the concept worthwhile. The piece of informa-
tion regarding the fasting of Jesus’ disciples is dealt with in the tradition pas-
sage of Mark 2,18-20.41 Scholars have usually seen the statement in v. 20, «the
days will come, when the bridegroom is taken away from them, and then they
will fast in that day», as a comment resulting from a later situation of the
Church where regular voluntary fast was indeed practiced. The comment was
needed to accommodate the message of vv. 18-19, namely that Jesus’ disciples
did not fast, to the later practice of the church. Thus, the statement represents
an anachronistic feature and, if deemed integral to the tradition passage, would
suggest its inauthenticity. However, scholars have generally regarded the fea-
ture as not integral. Why? Because it is unlikely that anyone would put forward
the non-fasting of Jesus’ disciples only to be able to argue for fasting later in
the church. Clearly, the anachronistic feature results from the adaptation of the
tradition by the Christian communities while the same cannot be said about the
rest of the information embodied by the tradition passage. The criteria opera-
tive here are implausibility and dissimilarity to Christianity.42
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39. As far as I can see, no tradition-critical model implies that the Jesus tradition cannot,
due to the nature of the tradition process, contain mislocations and anachronisms.
40. For this kind of negative criterion of implausibility, see theses 5 and 7 below. 
41. On what follows, see Holmén, Covenant Thinking, 134-155.
42. See Holmén, «Criteria», 47-49, 51-52; see also theses 4 and 7 below. 
Clearly, as to b), the problem the traditional tradition-critical analysis
sought to confront persists irrespective of the chosen tradition-critical model.
Likewise, it will obviously not disappear should the criteria of authenticity be
dispensed with. On the contrary, the criteria can offer a solution to the persist-
ing problem. At any rate, the idea of systematically striving at a reconstruction
of the original form of a tradition has hereby been left behind. Much, however,
remains to be said.
4. The Criterion of Dissimilarity is a Valid Tool of Authenticity and
Has No More or No Greater Odds Against It than the Other Stan-
dard Tools Have
Does it not seem very probable that Jesus indeed received John’s «baptism
of repentance for forgiveness of sins»?43 Would we not believe that sometime
during Jesus’ ministry his closest relatives sought to seize him as he seemed to
have «gone out of his mind»?44 Is it not true that Jesus’ crucifixion can be con-
sidered a most assured historical fact?45
What persuades us about the basic accuracy of these evaluations? It is the
realization that the early Christians would probably not have been interested in
fabricating the notions on which the evaluations are founded. In other words,
what persuades us about the probable basic historicity of the above three
notions is the criterion of dissimilarity in its application to early Christianity:46
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43. Mark 1,4; Luke 3,3; cf. Matt 3,2.6. 
44. Mark 3,21; no parallels.
45. Scholars share the opinion of G. Barth, Der Tod Jesu Christi im Verständnis des
Neuen Testaments, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag 1992, 1: «Nichts ist am Leben Jesu
historisch so sicher wie sein Tod am Kreuz». See also, for instance, N. A. Dahl, «Messianic
Ideas and the Crucifixion of Jesus», in J. H. Charlesworth et al. (eds.), The Messiah: Devel-
opments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992, 382–403, p. 382.
46. The so-called criterion of dissimilarity is still one of the most frequently applied method-
ological devices of current historical Jesus research. Though often put forward with a supply of
critical remarks, the criterion has, in one form or another, been accepted for the use of research
by scholars across the spectrum. Among scholars who discard the dissimilarity to Judaism aspect
and support what could be called the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity are, for example, B.
F. Meyer, The Aims of Jesus, London: SCM, 1979, 86; Id., «Objectivity and Subjectivity»,
547–548; A. F. Segal, Rebecca’s Children: Judaism and Christianity in the Roman World,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, 68–69; C. A. Evans, «Authenticity Criteria in Life
of Jesus Research», CSR 19 (1989) 6–31, p. 24–27; J. H. Charlesworth, Jesus within Judaism:
New Light from Exciting Archaeological Discoveries, London: SPCK, 1990, 5–6; S.-O. Back,
Jesus of Nazareth and the Sabbath Commandment, Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 1995,
18; G. Theissen – A. Merz, Der historische Jesus, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht,
1996, 118–120; S. E. Porter, The Criteria for Authenticity in Historical-Jesus Research: Previ-
The early Christians (i.e., the people behind the sources for Jesus) would proba-
bly not have devised notions about Jesus that they were not interested in or that
they could expect to lead to trouble.
Hence, if a tradition passage or a motif can be seen to be in this way dissim-
ilar to early Christian interests, its gain, success, views, practices and/or theo-
logical tendencies etc., it can be regarded as having a claim to authenticity.
Here we have the rationale and the resultant rule of application of the criteri-
on of dissimilarity to Christianity.47 This is the form of the dissimilarity criteri-
on that has survived the criticisms that have arisen at the final stages of the New
Quest (M. D. Hooker) and on the route to maturation of the Third Quest (G.
Theissen and D. Winter). Contary to what has sometimes been alleged, Hooker
did not wish to discard the dissimilarity criterion for good but wanted to under-
line the relativity of the results arrived at by means of any of the criteria. «And
what tools should he [the scholar] use in this task? He must, alas, use the tools
we have been discussing, for there are no others, and there are unlikely to be
any better ones discovered.»48 The criteria she had been discussing were dissim-
ilarity, coherence and multiple attestation. And again contrary to common
belief, Theissen and Winter do not discard the entire dissimilarity criterion but
only the double dissimilarity version. «The two aspects of the criterion of the
plausibility of historical effects take up two traditional criteria (or three, depend-
ing on one’s categories): on the one hand, the “criterion of dissimilarity” in its
application to early Christianity..., and, on the other hand, aspects of the criteria
of “coherence” and “multiple attestation”».49 Consequently, we meet these
scholars appealing to the dissimilarity criterion (that is, using the principle that
underlies the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity), although one repeatedly
finds statements claiming that they have rejected and abolished it:
T. HOLMÉN, «SEVEN THESES […] OF HISTORICAL JESUS RESEARCH» 357
ous Discussion and New Proposals, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000, 70–76; C. Tuck-
ett, «Sources and Methods», in M. Bockmuehl (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Jesus,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, 121-137, p. 132-133; Theissen – Winter, Plau-
sible Jesus, 169, 179. Those who uphold the so-called criterion of embarrassment can also be
included in this group of scholars; see, for instance, J. Breech, The Silence of Jesus: The
Authentic Voice of the Historical Man, Philadelphia: Fortress 1983, 22-26, and J. P. Meier, A
Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus. Volume One: The Roots of the Problem and the
Person, New York: Doubleday 1991, 168-171. Embarrassment is, in fact, a special case of the
criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity; see T. Holmén, «Doubts about Double Dissimilarity:
Restructuring the main criterion of Jesus-of-history research», in B. Chilton – C. A. Evans
(eds.), Authenticating the Words of Jesus Leiden: Brill, 1999, 47-80, p. 75-76; Theissen – Win-
ter, Plausible Jesus, 156. 
47. On the rationale and rule of application, see Holmén, «Criteria», 47. See also in thesis 6
below. 
48. Hooker, «Wrong Tool», 580-581. 
49. Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 179. 
Here, incidentally, is the real answer to those who from time to time have
attempted to argue that Jesus never existed: men might have made up a story about
a preacher and a healer, but never would they have invented such a crazy gospel as
this. The cross was a symbol of weakness—of total impotence. ... In proclaiming a
crucified Messiah as «good news», the first Christians clearly faced problems.50
Moreover, early Christianity developed a positive ethos with regard to the fami-
ly. Contrary to this tendency, however, it preserved the memory of a conflict
between Jesus and his family. According to Mark 3:21, Jesus’ «own» come to
Jesus and want to seize him as though he were out of his mind. This can not possi-
bly have been invented!51
And in order to cover all three examples given above, let us have a quota-
tion of yet another critic of the dissimilarity criterion:
Für die Glaubwürdigkeit dieser Nachricht [i.e., Jesus’ baptism by John] spricht
der doppelte Anstoß, den sie nach Ausweis der Quellen der Urkiche bot. Einerseits
stieß man sich daran, daß Jesus sich dem Täufer unterordnete, indem er sich von
ihm taufen ließ (Matt 3,14f.), andererseits empfand man es als schwierig, daß Jesus
sich einer Taufe «zur Vergebung der Sünden» unterzog. So ärgerniserregende
Nachrichten hat man nicht erfunden.52
In fact, tradition passages and motifs that allow reference be made to the
dissimilarity to Christianity criterion almost teem in the Jesus tradition and
scholars frequently make use of this characteristic. Although their character of
dissimilarity is not always as evident as is the case with the three examples
already given,53 in the following it is still quite obvious: Jesus’ dubious birth;
his table-fellowship with sinners; the strenuous prohibition of divorce and
remarriage early Christians had to struggle with; Jesus’ impious and impudent
words to a man who wanted to bury his father; the betrayal of Jesus by one of
his closest followers whom Jesus himself had chosen.54 Studies on these
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50. M. D. Hooker, Not Ashamed of the Gospel: New Testament Interpretations of the
Death of Christ, Carlisle: Paternoster, 1994, 9. 
51. Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 175. 
52. J. Jeremias, Neutestamentliche Theologie. Erster Teil: Die Verkündigung Jesu, Güter-
sloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1971, 52. On p. 14, Jeremias takes up the «criterion of
dissimilarity». While he accepts the criterion, he also comes up with some critical remarks
against it. Further, it is the double dissimilarity criterion that Jeremias discusses on p. 14. The
above quotation, however, portrays him applying the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity. 
53. Moreover, whatever passages one presents, further discussion would naturally be in order. 
54. A proper verdict on authenticity would, of course, require a detailed analysis of the texts,
but some further instances and the arguments they yield can be briefly expressed as follows:
Mark 11,17: the nations did not gather to Jerusalem, but the Christians engaged in Gentile mis-
sion outside the Holy Land; Mark 14,25: the logion is at variance with the Christological, soteri-
themes addressing the historicity question just need to be consulted to find
scholars appealing to the principle behind the criterion of dissimilarity to
Christianity.
Indeed, as Theissen and Winter state, the Third Quest has generally
endorsed the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity while rejecting the double
dissimilarity version. However, the statement by Theissen and Winter on this
matter contains an important point:
In the Third Quest, the CDJ [sc. criterion of dissimilarity to Judaism] is funda-
mentally rejected – with the help of a critical perception of the anti-Jewish element
in the history of Christian theology, and the CDC [sc. criterion of dissimilarity to
Christianity] is applied in a controlled manner.55
What does it mean to apply «CDC», that is, the criterion of dissimilarity to
Christianity, «in a controlled manner»? It means paying attention to the diffi-
culties encountered in the actual use of this criterion without however dismiss-
ing the criterion as such. The difficulties demand that, a), one is aware of them
and that, b), one involves certain counter measures. But they do not demand or
justify rejection of the criterion, as if using other criteria instead (not in addi-
tion!) would solve something. For, as will be seen shortly, the other criteria
have hazards of their own.
Hence, let us impose some control over the dissimilarity to Christianity cri-
terion.56 First, a), one should be aware that the criterion of dissimilarity to
Christianity does not work negatively suggesting that those tradition passages
or motifs that do not display dissimilarity to Christianity are inauthentic.57
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ological and eschatological ideas of early Christianity; Matt 8,11-12 / Luke 13,28-29: the logion
is difficult to combine with the Christian mission to the Gentiles; Matt 11,3-6 / Luke 7,20-23:
John’s hesitation puts Jesus on the defensive; Matt 11,16-19 / Luke 7,31-35: the pejorative char-
acterization of Jesus furnishes the opponents with arguments; Matt 12,28 / Luke 11,20: the key
concepts are foreign to the early Christian writings; Matt 19,28 / Luke 22,28-30: Jesus promises
rulership to the twelve, thus including even Judas; Luke 8,2: the chief witness to the empty tomb
is presented as a former demoniac. A careful combing through, for instance, the studies men-
tioned in footnote 46 above will easily multiply the number of these samples. 
55. Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 169 (emphasis added). 
56. I will only discuss here some central difficulties of the standard criteria. For a treatment
of all, real or alleged, difficulties that have been attached to the dissimilarity criterion, see my
forthcoming «The Criterion of Dissimilarity: FAQ». 
57. See, for example, M. D. Hooker, «Christology and Methodology», NTS 17 (1970-
1971) 480-487 p. 486; Calvert, «An Examination of the Criteria», 211-213; D. L. Mealand,
«The Dissimilarity Test», SJT 31 (1978) 41-50, p. 47; Meyer, «Objectivity and Subjectivity»,
548; C. A. Evans, Jesus and His Contemporaries: Comparative Studies, Leiden: Brill, 1995, 21;
C. S. Evans, The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The International Narrative as Histo-
ry, Oxford: Clarendon, 1996, 328-330; P. M. Casey, «Culture and Historicity: The Cleansing of
the Temple», CBQ 59 (1997) 306–332, p. 329-331; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 82. 
There is no «criterion of similarity» suggesting that when a piece of informa-
tion parallels the teachings of the early Church it should be regarded as inau-
thentic. While it is reasonable to think that the early Christians would not
invent things about Jesus uninteresting or disadvantageous to themselves, it
cannot be conversely presumed that they just could not find in him anything
interesting or advantageous, for why would they then have chosen to follow
him? Therefore, the criterion either supports or fails to support a given piece of
information. It cannot rule it out.
Consequently, b), one should not use the criterion of dissimilarity to Chris-
tianity in its negative mode! Instead, in cases where dissimilarity cannot be
established one should turn to other criteria. However, as shown in thesis 5
below, fulfilling the b) part of this difficulty in applying the criterion seems to
present an almost insurmountable task even for today’s scholarship.
Secondly, a), it is necessary to be aware that since the criterion is able to
identify as authentic such material only where Jesus differs from early Christ-
ian views, it cumulatively results in a biased picture of Jesus. The function-
ality of the criterion is restricted to a particular kind of material and, conse-
quently, what it inevitably produces is a particular selection of authentic
information.58
For this reason, b), when seeking to gather together authentic information
about Jesus, this criterion should not be the only tool of authenticity applied.
Criteria capable of probing the authenticity of such tradition passages or
motifs, too, where Jesus appears to accord with early Christian views ought to
accompany the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity, so balancing its
results.59 Let it be observed that the negative use of the criterion effectively
precludes this balancing pursuit. So even here, in encountering this difficulty
of application of the criterion, it would be important to act upon the awareness
of the first difficulty.
So far so good. Nevertheless, some might object, even though the criterion
of dissimilarity to Christianity (or the principle it relies on) is approved and
used very widely, including by many leading scholars engaged in this branch
of research, should not other tools of authenticity be preferred? For, indeed, the
dissimilarity criterion has its problems, as becomes obvious from the above
discussion. The critical question here is, of course, whether other tools are any
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58. Hooker, «Christology», 482. See also R. H. Stein, «The “Criteria” for Authenticity»,
in R. T. France – D. Wenham (eds.), Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels,
Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1983, 225-263, p. 242-243. 
59. Cf. Meier, Marginal Jew I, 173: «Especially with this criterion, complementary and
balancing insights from other criteria are vital». See also, for instance, J. Schröter, «Markus, Q
und der historische Jesus: Methodische und exegetische Erwägungen zu den Anfängen der
Rezeption der Verkündigung Jesu», ZNW 89 (1998) 173-200, p. 200. 
less problematic. I shall now limit myself to the two remaining standard crite-
ria of authenticity.
The criterion of multiple attestation has it that if a tradition passage or a
motif appears in two or more independent sources, it can be regarded as having
a claim to authenticity. A corresponding principle is commonly used as a tool
of the inner criticism of general historiography and is considered to be sound.
When applied to the gospels, however, the conclusiveness of the principle is
considerably reduced. Here all the sources have too much in common to be
characterized as «independent» in the sense that they might cherish different,
maybe even opposite opinions, or have substantially conflicting interests, and
so on. It is, then, only literary independence that is aimed at: Luke did not know
Matthew (or vice versa), Mark did not utilize Q (or vice versa). Thus, the
strongly persuasive sense of «accepted by friend and foe» is gone (though not
perhaps completely), and what the existence of a tradition passage or a motif
in, for example, both Q and Mark factually attests to is that the tradition or
motif in question antedates these two sources. The rationale that upholds this
criterion is clearly weaker than that of the criterion of dissimilarity to Chris-
tianity.60 One can also observe that the functionality of the criterion is to an
important degree dependent on source-critical solutions. As can be deduced,
the most favourable solution from the point of view of the usability of the cri-
terion, is the synoptic four-source hypothesis. Choosing the Griesbach hypoth-
esis or the like greatly disempowers the criterion. 
According to the criterion of coherence, if a tradition passage or a motif is
coherent with what has already been deemed as authentic, it can be regarded as
having a claim to authenticity. The applicability of this criterion is limited by
the demand that the tradition passage or motif to be tested should be compared
with material the authenticity of which has already been determined. Thus, the
criterion cannot be applied until some authentic material has already been
identified. By the same token, the criterion is contingent upon the usability and
cogency of the criteria by means of which the required authentic material is
determined. Hence, if we discard the dissimilarity criterion, the criterion of
coherence is bound to rely upon material singled out on the basis of the criteri-
on of multiple attestation which, as we saw, is not a particularly forceful crite-
rion.
Hence, the other standard criteria do not promise anything better which
would justify a claim to supplant the dissimilarity criterion. Naturally, criteria
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60. The rationale that upholds the criterion of multiple attestation can be expressed as fol-
lows: An attestation in two or more independent sources means that the tradition passage or
motif in question is earlier than these sources. An early tradition or motif, again, has on average
a greater probability of authenticity than a later one. See further in thesis 6 below.
besides these standard ones could be brought into the discussion.61 Further,
somebody could come with a whole new set of criteria,62 others, again, could
demand that a completely new breed of tools should be developed.63 However,
the way scholarship more generally has sought to solve the difficulty that all
criteria have problems of their own has not been to discard the criteria found
flawed, as if there would be hope of discovering one completely flawless tool,
but to use the criteria jointly so that they can complement each other. This is
also what the controlled application of the criterion of dissimilarity to Chris-
tianity leads to. In fact, the observation that the difficulties of the dissimilarity
criterion should be faced, not by dismissing the criterion but by using it in
company with others, can be related to all of the criteria. While each individual
criterion is insufficient as the sole basis of the analysis, the criteria taken all
together can be expected to provide some relevant results. In this good compa-
ny even the criterion of dissimilarity of Christianity has its place: «The first
place is held by the quest for elements that resist the tendencies of the tradi-
tion».64 Likewise, every new criterion that can contribute to this pursuit is wel-
come.
5.  The Negative Application of the Dissimilarity Criterion Should
Be Abandoned – even in Practice
When introducing the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity to a group of
students or to a lecture audience or the like, it regularly happens that someone
gets up and voices his or her disbelief in the functionality of the criterion: rea-
soning like this seems to exclude all such material where early Christians
would have agreed with Jesus. And that cannot be right! One then needs to
point out that the criterion does not seek to exclude any material, but that it
only serves to supply arguments for authenticity when material displaying dis-
similarity to Christianity is at hand. As regards material that can be considered
similar (or not dissimilar) to Christianity the criterion has no say. In other
words, there is no negative usage for the criterion of dissimilarity to Christiani-
ty. Recognition of this usually proves faith restoring.
Indeed, the negative use of the criterion has long been refuted by scholars.65
No one wants to put forward the peculiar claim that the first Christians did not
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61. Cf. the repertoire introduced in Holmén, «Criteria», 47-52.
62. The best recent example of this is Porter, Historical-Jesus Research. 
63. Cf. the discussion on thesis 1 above. 
64. Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 211. «Resisting the tendencies of the tradition» is
one of their characterizations of the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity. 
65. See the discussion on the previous thesis.
find anything agreeable in Jesus’ proclamation that they would have deemed
worth preserving and that, instead, they preserved such things alone with
which they disagreed or in which they were uninterested. On the contrary, it is
concluded, the first Christians must have willingly accepted at least some
aspects of Jesus’ message. Similarly, they must have passed on at least some
such aspects. For this very reason, similarity to Christianity of a tradition pas-
sage or a motif cannot suggest inauthenticity.
However, although in principle rejected by scholars, actually refraining
from using the negative application of the criterion has proven to be surprising-
ly difficult. Not seldom does one encounter the thought that a piece of informa-
tion corresponds «too closely» to early Christian interests to be regarded as
authentic. Especially liable to such reasoning appear to be instances where the
piece of information serves the aims of the evangelist-redactor relating it.
Nonetheless, unless one thinks that the evangelists cannot have fully agreed
with Jesus in anything, one has to stick to the rule: the criterion either supports
authenticity or fails to support it; not being found dissimilar does not justify
questioning a tradition passage’s or a motif’s authenticity. The evaluation of
authenticity naturally changes if the tradition passage or motif cannot be plau-
sibly pictured within Jesus’ surroundings. However, it is not then the criterion
of dissimilarity that is applicable. Instead, one should more properly speak of
the implausibility of the piece of information with respect to Jesus’ context,
time and place. Hence, the criterion of implausibility has come into play.66
This line of thought might lie behind, for example, the criterion of Sanders
and Davies according to which «a passage or a theme is shown to be historical-
ly reliable if it is directly against what the evangelist wished to be so. Con-
versely, it is historically unlikely if it agrees too closely with what they wished
and corresponds to Christian doctrine».67 While the first part of this criterion in
a way paraphrases the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity, as regards the
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66. What I here call the criterion of implausibility is more generally known as the criterion
of Palestinian environment (or the like; see, for example, Evans, Jesus, 22-23) in its negative
fashion: that which does not fit Jesus’ environment (the pre- AD 70 Jewish Palestine) is proba-
bly inauthentic. Or as defined by Meier: «A saying that reflects social, political, economic, or
religious conditions that existed only outside Palestine or only after the death of Jesus is to be
considered inauthentic», Meier, Marginal Jew I, 180. This also forms an integral part of the cri-
terion of contextual plausibility of Theissen and Winter: being appropriate with respect to Jesus’
context forms the prerequisite to which all tradition passages and motifs should acquiesce to be
considered authentic. Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 180. See further Holmén, «Crite-
ria», 51-52. 
67. E. P. Sanders – M. Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, London: SCM 1989, 304-
305. The following for instance argues in keeping with the latter part of the statement: R. J.
Miller, «Historical Method and the Deeds of Jesus: The Test Case of the Temple Demonstra-
tion», Forum 8 (1992) 5-22, p. 22. 
last part one is bound to ask: do the writers really mean that Jesus’ followers
could never quite agree with him or that even if they sometimes could agree
with him fully, they would not pass on those points of clear agreement (while
many points of disagreement would have been preserved)? Or is it not in fact
so that the writers actually mean to speak of things that would have emerged
only together with early Christian developments of Jesuanic ideas and that,
because of this, appear implausible when assessed against Jesus’ time and con-
text? Such things, however, should not be linked to the criterion of dissimilari-
ty to Christianity in any way but rather should be specified as relevant to
another tool of authenticity, viz. the criterion of implausibility. Elsewhere
Sanders and Davies reject the negative application,68 but by the «with the
grain», criterion they assume it.
What could merely be suspected in the above example is clearly the case
with the rule put forward by Funk. He first states: «Features of stories that
serve Christian convictions directly are likely to be the product of the Christian
imagination».69 This represents a negative application of the criterion of dis-
similarity to Christianity and as such the rule is invalid. For it cannot be
assumed that Christians would never have found the teachings of Jesus serving
their interests «directly» but that they always deemed it necessary to adapt
them somehow before they could adopt them. However, almost right after this
Funk brings in an idea that, as it were, clarifies the first statement: «Traces of
later Christian orthodoxy attributed to Jesus or his first followers are anachro-
nistic».70 This, however, is a completely different matter! Now Funk is speak-
ing of features that did not emerge until later and that are therefore rightfully to
be considered implausible with respect to Jesus’ time and context.71 Funk,
nonetheless, clearly relates both ideas to the dissimilarity criterion since he
paraphrases the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity in what follows (now
correctly in its positive fashion).72 Such mixing of two clearly different princi-
ples is always unfortunate when encountered in a methodology. Regrettably,
too, this particular mix-up is tantamount to arguing for the negative application
of the dissimilarity criterion.
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68. Their rejection is not, however, marked. It happens when they discuss the criterion of
double dissimilarity (under the name «Uniqueness»); see Sanders – Davies, Studying, 316-
323. «“Non-unique” does not prove “inauthentic”», Sanders – Davies, Studying, 322. 
69. Funk, Acts of Jesus, 35.
70. Funk, Acts of Jesus, 35.
71. J. P. Meier, for one, would concur with Funk here. See his definition of the negative
environmental criterion quoted in footnote 66 above.
72. Data that has survived in spite of being unfavorable to the Christian cause has «a
greater claim to historicity». He gives the example of Jesus’ baptism by John, Funk, Acts of
Jesus, 35.
Indeed, the negative application of the criterion of dissimilarity to Chris-
tianity many times interferes with methodological reasoning even after having
been explicitly rejected. D. Allison, for example, acknowledges that eliminat-
ing items from the corpus of authentic materials by means of the criterion, that
is, applying it negatively, represents its misuse.73 Still, he can claim that the
criteria of dissimilarity and multiple attestation contradict each other in this
particular way:
The more frequently a complex is attested, the more congenial, one naturally
infers, it was to early Christians. But the more congenial a complex was to early
Christians, surely the less likely it is, for the critical, skeptical historian, that Jesus
composed it. Conversely, the less congenial a tradition, the more likely its origin
with Jesus and the less likely its multiple attestation. Here the criterion of multiple
attestation is in a tug-of-war with the criterion of dissimilarity: they pull the same
unit in opposite directions.74
Nonetheless, what suggests that a «unit» that is multiply attested, and thus
«congenial to early Christians», is inauthentic, is not the version of the dissimi-
larity criterion accepted by Allison himself. Rather, it is the negative applica-
tion of the criterion. As just remarked, Allison labels elimination of material by
means of the dissimilarity criterion as its misuse. In the «tug-of-war» described
above, however, misuse is taken as the proper usage, so creating the contradic-
tion with the criterion of multiple attestation.
In other words, it does indeed hold true that much of the material singled
out by the criterion of multiple attestation does not clearly display any dissimi-
larity. Focusing largely on such kind of material, however, the criterion of mul-
tiple attestation still does not contradict the criterion of dissimilarity to Chris-
tianity but only the negative version thereof. On the other hand, when using the
dissimilarity criterion correctly, that is, refraining from conclusions as regards
authenticity where dissimilarity is not detected, multiple attestation nicely
works as one of the balancing criteria spoken of above: it counteracts the bias
cumulatively caused by the dissimilarity criterion.75
Let us take one more example illustrating what abandoning the negative
application of the dissimilarity to Christianity criterion should mean in prac-
tice. A most conspicuous case would, as remarked, deal with a tradition pas-
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73. «All too often, however, dissimilarity has been misused as a means of separating the
authentic from the unauthentic, that is, a way of eliminating items from the corpus of authentic
materials»: D. Allison, «How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria of Authenticity», in T.
Holmén – S. E. Porter (eds.), Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Leiden: Brill,
2009, forthcoming.
74. Allison, «Traditional Criteria», forthcoming.
75. See the previous thesis.
sage or a motif expressly serving the aims of the evangelist-redactor who
relates it. It is only by chance that the instance below comes from R. Gundry’s
commentary. Many other works paying attention to historical questions could
have equally been consulted.
Gundry observes how the pericope Matt 16,17-19 abounds in expressions
and motifs typical of Matthew.76 Consequently, he considers the pericope to be
a Matthean composition in Greek.77 This is using the dissimilarity criterion to
exclude material as inauthentic, purely and simply: since Matt 16,17-19 is so
similar to Christianity, specifically to Matthew’s own theology, it is deemed
secondary.
Let us pause to reflect. How often do we indeed encounter precisely this
kind of reasoning and, simply, let it pass while perhaps even thinking it is mak-
ing sense. Nevertheless, accepting such reasoning means accepting the nega-
tive application of the dissimilarity criterion. This we cannot do, can we?78
Therefore, in order to avoid a situation where we reject something in principle
while accepting it in practice, we need to know exactly how to deal with con-
crete cases that realize the principle.
So, what should we do with the deeply Matthean (according to Gundry)
pericope of Matt 16,17-19 and with all others like it in order not to resort to
applying the dissimilarity criterion negatively? The first observation is that
despite the fact that the language and some expressions of the text may result
from Matthew’s editing, it is in principle still quite possible that it builds on
tradition: in a most natural way, Matthew would have seized and passed on the
tradition passage precisely because he found it presenting so many ideas
important to himself. In this way, two equally possible provenances of the
material central to Matt 16,17-19 are acknowledged, viz. Matthean and pre-
Matthean. The second step is to recognize that the only way to decide between
these two provenances is to consider whether the ideas found in the text can
indeed have had a pre-Matthean existence. In particular, trying to reach the his-
torical Jesus, it must be asked whether the ideas embodied by the text emerge
as plausible when viewed in Jesus’ context, time and place. If then plausibility,
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76. R. H. Gundry, Matthew: A Commentary on His Handbook for a Mixed Church under
Persecution, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994, 330-336. 
77. Gundry, Matthew, 333, 335. 
78. Sometimes reassurance is in order: Is it so that the first Christians did not find anything
agreeable in Jesus’ proclamation that they would have deemed worth preserving but that,
instead, they preserved such things alone that they disagreed with or were disinterested in? Or is
it the case, on the contrary, that the first Christians must have willingly accepted at least some
aspects of Jesus’ message and that they must have passed on at least some of such aspects? And
how can we tell that we are not looking at one such aspect right now in Matt 16,17-19? This last
question is pursued immediately below in the text of the article. 
rather than implausibility (hence, it is the criterion of implausibility that is
being assessed here), can be established with respect to Jesus’ context,
Matthew’s eager endorsement of the ideas can in no way be taken as an argu-
ment for their inauthenticity. Still, neither do we have any argument for
authenticity at hand, but we are simply left with the two possible alternatives
of provenance.79
Now, to accept this state of indecisiveness is a matter on which a great deal
hangs. For by so doing the possibility is retained of continuing to argue for the
authenticity of the piece of information in question instead of just dumping it
as inauthentic because of its obvious similarity to Christianity. And so an
escape from resorting to the negative application of the criterion of dissimilari-
ty is found! Just in case I may seem to be getting my resistance to the negative
application of the criterion out of all proportion, allow me to point out what is
at stake here: this is the only way to take seriously the need to accommodate
continuity, besides discontinuity, between Jesus and his followers. Indeed, it is
not so much the criterion of dissimilarity proper that causes Jesus to be
detached from his followers but the negative application of it, which may in
fact be the most frequently employed «tool» in scholarship. Sometimes even
those who in principle completely reject the whole dissimilarity criterion use it
in the negative fashion.
6.  THE SO-CALLED CRITERION OF MULTIPLE ATTESTATION SHOULD BE DE-
LUMPED
The criteria are best explicated by describing their application and stating
the reason and ground –the rationale– on which the criterion and its application
rely. For instance, the criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity can be explicat-
ed thus:
Rule of application: If a piece of information can be seen to be dissimilar to
early Christianity (its gain, success, interests, views, practices and/or theological
tendencies, and so on), it can be regarded as having a claim to authenticity.
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79. What is crucially lacking in Gundry’s handling of Matt 16,17-19 is thus that he is not
interested in considering the question of the pre-Matthean plausibility of the central ideas of
the tradition passage. Their similarity to Matthew’s emphases suffices for him as an indica-
tion of their secondary character, i.e., of their inauthenticity. Ergo: Gundry is using the crite-
rion of dissimilarity to Christianity negatively to label the piece of information as inauthentic
while, instead, the possible applicability of the criterion of implausibility should have been
studied.
Rationale: The early Christians (i.e., the people behind the sources for Jesus)
would probably not have devised notions about Jesus in which they were not inter-
ested or that they could expect to lead to trouble.
An unwritten law implicitly followed by those who develop and deal with
the criteria is that one should not have two or more paraphrases of one and the
same criterion, or better, of one and the same rationale on which a criterion
can be based, but that one should avoid repetition of the same underlying
principles. Similarly, none of the criteria should be part of, or overlap with,
another. The aim herewith is that each and every one of the various criteria
should be based on a rationale of its own. In this way, too, one can ensure
that, basically, the probability of authenticity increases alongside the number
of criteria suggesting authenticity. So for example D. Polkow in his important
article, after cataloguing 25 proposed criteria combines and reorders them
according to the underlying principles so that he is left at the end with six dif-
ferent criteria.80
On the other hand, it also stands to reason that no one criterion should build
on two or more different and distinct rationales. In other words, the rationale to
the criterion ratio should be one to one. It could, then, be asked whether, for
instance, the rationale of the dissimilarity to Christianity criterion stated above
is in fact a compound of two slightly different ideas: a piece of information can
be characterized as being of no interest to early Christians or as predictably
causing trouble to them. If it is deemed it better to divide the rationale this
way, two different criteria instead of only one can be upheld. Retaining the
names of criteria already in use, we could call them the criterion of dissimilari-
ty to Christianity (disinterest) and the criterion of embarrassment (trouble). For
my part, I have elsewhere argued that the rationale cannot be divided in this
way,81 and, in my view, anyone who begs to differ should correspondingly
argue his or her case. That is, it should be demonstrated that «being of no inter-
est» and «causing trouble» do not overlap and that, on the contrary, if only one
criterion is built on them it would mean lumping together two different ratio-
nales.
Be this as it may in this instance (although I believe I am well justified in
my case), there is one traditional criterion that I think is indeed based on two
different rationales simply being lumped together. This is the criterion known
by the name multiple attestation. A representative description is that put for-
ward by J. P. Meier:
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80. D. Polkow, «Method and Criteria for Historical Jesus Research», in K. H. Richards
(ed.), Society of Biblical Literature 1987 Seminar Papers, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987, 336-
356. p. 337-342.
81. Holmén, «Doubts about Double Dissimilarity», 75-76; Id., «Criteria», 49.
The criterion of multiple attestation ... focuses on those sayings or deeds of
Jesus that are attested in more than one independent literary source.82
It is telling that scholars do not often spell out the reason (the rationale)
why this criterion should be seen to provide an argument for authenticity. As
seen above in the discussion concerning thesis 4, what it factually attests to is
merely that the piece of information found in, say, two independent sources is
earlier than either of these sources. The discussion of B. F. Meyer is one of the
most explicit concerning the multiple attestation criterion in this respect. The
strongest ground that he can adduce for the cogency of the criterion is that
«“multiple” points to “early” and “early” to “historical”».83 Even so, Meyer
warns that these links should not be regarded as guaranteed in individual
cases.84 Rather, they hold only with statistical generality. Hence, the rationale
of the criterion of multiple attestation could look like this:
An attestation in two or more independent sources means that the tradition pas-
sage or motif in question is earlier than these sources. An early tradition or motif,
again, has on average a greater probability of authenticity than a later one.
Interestingly, then, the way scholars usually support their use of the criteri-
on of multiple attestation is not by stating this, nor a corresponding rationale or
explication, but by referring to examples such as the kingdom of God procla-
mation by Jesus or Jesus’ exorcisms, concerning the historicity of which all
today’s Jesus questers feel confident. Admittedly, these motifs can also be said
to be «attested in more than one independent literary source». However, the
reason why we feel convinced about their historicity is not because of their
proven existence prior to the sources in question. Rather, we think that the
broad and diffuse attestation of the motifs mentioned must mean that they
existed from the very beginning and were generally recognized as Jesuanic. In
principle, a tradition passage witnessed in two independent sources could be
explained away by referring to a common source that lies behind the passages.
The question of authenticity would then merely be transferred one step back-
wards and posed with respect to the tradition passage in that source. This is in
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82. Meier, Marginal Jew I, 174. I omit the addition «and/or in more than one literary form
or genre» (p. 174), for it does not really form part of the problem at issue now and could merely
confuse things. I have addressed this question in Holmén, «Criteria», 49.
83. Meyer, «Objectivity and Subjectivity», 551.
84. I have spelled out Meyer’s argument for the criterion in Holmén, Covenant Thinking,
33. For some reason, E. Eve, «Meier, Miracle and Multiple Attestation», JSHJ 3 (2005) 23-45,
p. 29, after quoting some statements of mine about the multiple attestation criterion in that study,
claims that I do not at all explain the statements. My explanation follows immediately after the
words quoted by Eve. In general, Eve ignores Meyer’s remarks on multiple attestation. 
fact how Q-material is dealt with. Although virtually all Q-material can be
found attested independently by Matthew and Luke, this is not deemed to justi-
fy an appeal to the criterion of multiple attestation but, instead, arguments for
authenticity are sought starting from the Q-material itself. Not so with motifs
attested recurrently throughout the Jesus tradition. They can never be reduced
to manifestations of but one single source, which is then made responsible for
answering the question of authenticity. Furthermore, they cannot be dismissed
as secondary even if entire sources should be disclosed to be fictitious through
and through.
What these considerations reveal is that such recurrently attested motifs, in
fact, build on a rationale clearly different from the one discernible behind ordi-
nary multiple attestations.85 Indeed, the leap from individual pieces of informa-
tion attested in two or three tradition passages to general motifs appearing scat-
tered throughout the Jesus tradition means a difference in kind. It is a different
principle and rationale that is operative behind the recurrent attestations. Con-
sequently, we should refer to two different criteria to be labelled, for example,
«the criterion of multiple attestation» and «the criterion of recurrent attesta-
tion».86 Yet, the two principles have been lumped together from McArthur and
Perrin to Meier and Porter,87 sometimes even being supported by examples that
exclusively give expression to recurrent attestation (e.g. the already mentioned
kingdom proclamation). This is probably also the reason for Allison’s observa-
tion that scholars have, in fact, made frequent use of the recurrent attestation
principle he now puts forward as an alternative to the standard criteria of
authenticity:88 the principle has been in use because it has formed part of the
standard criterion of multiple attestation (which Allison all but denounces).89
However, that Allison, Dunn and others90 can consider the recurrent attestation
principle a tool of historicity of its own is further proof of its independency of
the criterion of multiple attestation. A rationale for it can be formulated:
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85. Eve, «Multiple Attestation», 45, incorrectly believes this is a combination of multiple
attestation and criterion of coherence. For the boundary between these two criteria, see Holmén,
«Criteria», 50. 
86. For the designation «recurrent attestation», see Allison, «Traditional Criteria», forth-
coming. I have adopted Allison’s designation and used it alongside the traditional «multiple
attestation», in Holmén, «Criteria», 47, 49. 
87. H. K. McArthur, «Basic Issues: A Survey of Recent Gospel Research», Int 18 (1964)
39-55, p. 48; Perrin, Rediscovering, 46; Meier, Marginal Jew I, 174-175; Porter, Historical-
Jesus Research, 86.
88. Allison, «Traditional Criteria», forthcoming: «It is in favor of what I am saying that
scholars often conduct business as though what I am saying is true». 
89. Allison also seems not to be aware of that the recurrent attestation principle has been
included in the criterion of multiple attestation.
90. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 330-335; Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 177.
A greater dispersion of a motif suggests that the motif has landed in the Jesus
tradition very early and through several tradents. It further suggests that already
then the motif had been widely accepted and experienced as central. There are no
better options for finding historically accurate reminiscences of Jesus.91
All in all, the traditional criterion of multiple attestation should be de-
lumped! In addition to the actual criterion of multiple attestation (rule of appli-
cation: «if a tradition passage or a motif appears in two or more independent
sources, it can be regarded as having a claim to authenticity»), producing an
argument for authenticity to be considered weak to mediocre, we now have the
criterion of recurrent attestation (rule of application: «if a motif has gathered
numerous, recurrent attestations across the sources, it can be regarded as hav-
ing a claim to authenticity»), resulting in an argument for authenticity to be
deemed good to strong. Hence, the number of criteria is increased by one very
prominent criterion.92 This is good news.
7. What the Current Jesus Research Is Desperately in Need of Is
Negative Criteria
Combing through various lists of authenticity criteria one observes that
there are, in fact, two basic types of criteria: positive and negative. Positive cri-
teria are those appeal to which can provide arguments for authenticity. When
appeal can be made to negative criteria, arguments against authenticity or for
inauthenticity are available.
The lists of criteria also yield an observation which, though remarkable, has
been given very little consideration so far: quite regularly, the majority of the
criteria appearing in the lists, many times all of them, are positive ones. Only a
few negative criteria seem to exist and they are often referred to in passing
only. What are the reasons for this? What are the consequences?
As remarked when discussing thesis 3 above, the topos of authenticity criteria
was introduced and included in the discussion of the historical Jesus already at
the beginning of the twentieth century. A more common awareness of the need
for such methodological tools, however, did not emerge until the commencement
of the New Quest in the 1950’s. A reason for the increase of the awareness at
this point in time was that the revived interest in the historical figure of Jesus
then had to face scepticism about the historical reliability of the gospels, which,
mainly in the wake of form criticism, had affected scholarship rather broadly.
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91. Holmén, «Criteria», 47.
92. For the evaluations good to strong (criterion of recurrent attestation) and weak to
mediocre (criterion of multiple attestation), see Holmén, «Criteria», 47, 49. 
The usual methodological starting point, appropriate in view of the scepticism,
was to place the burden of proof on showing authenticity: the analysis should
seek to prove the historicity of a Jesus tradition; without any proofs to that end,
in contrast, the tradition would be assumed to be inauthentic.93
These scholarly outlooks have been formative for the development of the
authenticity criteria. As a result, the discussion about the criteria has concen-
trated on finding tools that can provide arguments for authenticity, not against
it or for inauthenticity.94 All deeper reflection, consideration of problems, refin-
ing of definitions, and so on has concerned the positive criteria while, passive-
ly, scepticism about the sources has been left to counterbalance the one-sided-
ness of the pursuits. It was the scepticism that created the need for the positive
criteria, justified concentration of the scholarly discussion on them, and at the
same time fended off contemplation of the negative criteria.
However, the views of the gospels as sources for historical information
about Jesus have changed since the heyday of form criticism. The predominant
position has clearly moved in a more trusting direction.95 As one unfailing sign
of this, the burden of proof is no more squarely placed on showing authentici-
ty. One mainly encounters the middle position, that is, the burden of proof is
claimed to lie on the one who wants to prove something, whether authenticity
or inauthenticity.96 And increasingly, one can also find studies where the bur-
den is placed on showing inauthenticity.97 There has, in other words, been a
change in the basic attitudes towards the sources. The kind of scepticism that
once, in a way, adopted the role of the negative criteria in that inauthenticity
was assumed if not proven otherwise, is there no more!
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93. «We no longer have to prove the unauthenticity, but (and this is far harder) their authen-
ticity»; H. Zahrnt, The Historical Jesus, New York: Harper, 1960, 107-108; «The obligation
now laid upon us is to investigate and make credible not the possible unauthenticity of the indi-
vidual unit of material but, on the contrary, its genuineness»; E. Käsemann, «The Problem of
the Historical Jesus», in Essays on New Testament Themes London: SCM Press, 1964, 15-47,
34. See also, for instance, Perrin, Rediscovering, 39. 
94. As another result, also noted when discussing thesis 3 above, the criteria became inti-
mately adapted to work in tandem with tradition- and form-critical principles, such as seeing the
gospel tradition as consisting of small units with histories of their own as separate entities. 
95. See E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, London: SCM, 1985, 2; C. A. Evans, «Recon-
structing Jesus’ Teaching: Problems and Possibilities», in J. H. Charlesworth – L. L. Johns
(eds.), Hillel and Jesus: Comparative Studies of Two Major Religious Leaders, Minneapolis:
Fortress, 1997, 397-426, p. 397-398; Holmén, «Criteria», 45. 
96. Proposed already by Hooker, «Wrong Tool», 580. More recently by Meyer, Aims, 81-
87; Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 13; Meier, Marginal Jew I, 183; Theissen – Winter, Plausi-
ble Jesus, 204. 
97. S. C. Goetz – C. L. Blomberg, «The Burden of Proof», JSNT 11 (1981) 39-63, p. 51-
52; D. R. A. Hare, The Son of Man Tradition, Minneapolis: Fortress 1990, 257. As noted in
footnote 27 above, even Perrin in practice sometimes placed the burden of proof in this way. 
This should necessarily call for reconsideration of previous decisions. Sur-
prisingly enough, however, in focusing almost exclusively on positive criteria
today’s scholarship still tends to reflect the old situation. There is virtually no
discernible interest in discussing the negative criteria. Yet, merely thinking of
the burden of proof question and the different solutions to it that today can be
regarded as relevant, such recalcitrance is unsustainable. If one accepts the
middle position as a valid scheme for the placement of the burden of proof,
how can one think inauthenticity could be proven if there are no, or not cogent
enough, criteria for that purpose? Preoccupied with positive criteria alone,
scholarship is in reality well equipped only to argue for authenticity, and so the
middle position remains a dead principle. However, the obligation to present
working negative criteria is particularly urgent when given the idea that the
burden of proof lies on showing inauthenticity. Failing then to state clearly the
criteria by means of which inauthenticity could be shown, effectively invali-
dates one’s analysis of authenticity.
With respect to these considerations, an obvious obstacle is constituted by
the fact that, at the present time, only two negative criteria seem to be warrant-
ed. The first, and most important, one is the criterion of implausibility:
Rule of application: If a tradition passage or a motif involves features integral
to it that are incapable of being plausibly situated in the Palestine of Jesus’ time,
inauthenticity of the tradition or motif is suggested.
Rationale: Such features are by definition mislocations and/or anachronisms,
and tradition passages or motifs that integrally depend on them can be deemed as
mislocated and/or anachronistic traditions and motifs.
There have been attempts to sustain a positive variation of this criterion,
suggesting authenticity of tradition passages or motifs well at home in first-
century Palestine.98 Suitability with respect to the Jesuanic context should,
however, be seen as the precondition to which any piece of information should
conform in order not to be disqualified as inauthentic (the underlying funda-
mental question at issue here is the endeavour, emphasized by the Third Quest,
to view Jesus within the Judaism of his time). This is precisely how Theissen
and Winter present their criterion of contextual appropriateness: being appro-
priate with respect to Jesus’ context forms the prerequisite to which all tradi-
tions and motifs to be considered authentic should acquiesce.99 Therefore,
although taking a positive form, contextual appropriateness according to Theis-
sen and Winter works like the negative criterion of implausibility. Understand-
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98. See footnote 66 above.
99. Theissen – Winter, Plausible Jesus, 180.
ably, to be found implausible with respect to Jesus’ Jewish context is equiva-
lent to not fulfilling the precondition of being always plausible with respect to
the context. Since the other positive criteria cannot be regarded as precondi-
tions (for this would mean applying them negatively, which must not be done),
a «criterion of implausibility» is to be preferred over against a «criterion of
plausibility». Then all the criteria, both positive and negative ones, can be
regarded as yielding an argument –for or against authenticity respectively–
when applicable, but where they cannot be applied they do not suggest other-
wise. That is, when the positive criteria are inapplicable they do not suggest
inauthenticity and, again, the negative criteria when inapplicable do not sug-
gest authenticity.100
Another valid negative criterion is that of incoherence. However, this crite-
rion remains rather far from the strength and decisiveness of argument of the
implausibility criterion.
Rule of application: If a tradition passage or a motif is incoherent with what has
already been deemed as authentic, inauthenticity of the tradition passage or motif is
suggested.
Rationale: On the basis of what we already know about Jesus, this is what we
would not expect him to say or do.
The support for inauthenticity provided by this negative criterion is rela-
tively weak, mainly because the concept of incoherence serves as a rather fee-
ble basis for inferences: a) people tend to be inconsistent; b) the ancient Semit-
ic thought differs from ours, for example, by being more attracted to paradoxes
and tensions; c) when preaching on various occasions and for various people,
Jesus probably did not aim at, and could hardly accomplish, a body of teaching
that would resemble a systematic presentation.101
These two negative criteria are not in constant, let alone consistent, use in
today’s scholarship, and I greatly doubt that upholding them more often would
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100. Let it be noted, further, that the negative use of the criterion of dissimilarity to Chris-
tianity actually represents an incomplete form of the criterion of implausibility: traditions or
motifs similar to early Christianity are, without further ado, treated as if they were mislocations
or anachronisms. Naturally, mislocations and anachronisms do display similarity to early Christ-
ian views from which they derive, but above all they are, at the same time, incapable of being
situated within the Palestine of Jesus’ time. The fallacious negative «criterion of similarity to
Christianity» thus errs in not paying attention to whether the traditions or motifs deemed similar
to Christianity could still also be seen as plausible with respect to Jesus’ context. Cf. also the
discussion on thesis 5 above, in particular the treatment of Gundry. 
101. The criterion of incoherence cannot actually be equated with a negative use of the cri-
terion of coherence (see in thesis 4 above). For besides being mutually coherent or incoherent,
two issues can also be irrelevant to each other. 
suffice to put the authenticity method in better order. Let therefore a call for
papers entertaining additional negative criteria be issued. 
In the light of the predominantly sceptical view of the sources during the
New Quest, the required tools were naturally those capable of identifying
authentic material. The situation is now better in that the dilemma formed by
overconfidence in the criteria of authenticity resulting from a lack of confi-
dence in the sources is usually avoided.102 Most Third Quest scholars can
accept that a probability of authenticity suffices to make a piece of information
provided by the sources useable for historical Jesus study. As the flip side,
however, an exclusive use of tools suited to identifying authentic material can
no longer count as an adequate authenticity method. The two more widely
known negative criteria, again, may not be able to greatly improve on the situ-
ation even if they were introduced into the list of more regularly employed cri-
teria. Hence, the need for serious discussion, inquiry and development of new
negative criteria is obvious.
*   *   *
Having nailed up my theses, I wish to congratulate the Facultat de Teologia
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Sumari
La discussió sobre els anomenats criteris d’autenticitat no és precisament una
poma de la discòrdia dintre la recerca del Jesús històric. Mentre s’originava en el
moment del darrer alè de la First Quest (die Leben Jesu Forschung) no havia estat prò-
piament incorporada en l’agenda de la recerca sobre Jesús fins als dies d’auge de la
Second/New Quest. En diverses branques de la Third Quest, novament, aquests crite-
ris es consideren com a centrals i necessaris, tot i que també és una eina problemàtica
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102. Cf. the discussion on thesis 2 above.
per a la recerca. No obstant això, van sorgir perspectives més crítiques i pessimistes. A
més d’ordenar les diferents tesis, aquest article intenta d’intervenir en la discussió
d’alguns d’aquests criteris i en la majoria dels seus punts més crítics. Aquestes tesis
ens remeten a qüestions plantejades sobre aquests criteris durant molt de temps, així
com a algunes de noves que esperonen, inter alia, els plantejaments actuals i obliguen
a refer la tradició històrica dels evangelis (sinòptics) en la investigació actual.
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